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Abstract 
 
As a prerequisite for joining the EMU, states must meet certain convergence criteria, because there are 
significant differences among countries, which have their political and institutional origins, which can affect 
integration efficiency. All this imposes the need for a comparative analysis of  the situation in which Serbia is 
in relation to the Eurozone. This paper should provide a useful basis, to what extent monetary policy of  the 
NBS agrees or deviates from the monetary policy of  the ECB and the EMU, which represent final goal of  
Serbia on the path of  European integration. A comparative analysis of  the monetary policy of  the National 
Bank of  Serbia and the European Central Bank will be carried out by statistical methods that will show the 
degree of  (in) connection between the two policies and their interconnection, and on the basis of  certain 
common variables. 
 
Key words: monetary policy, ECB, NBS, ANOVA. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The modern central bank is a product of  the 20th century, regardless of  the fact that some of  the 
central banks have a much longer history; only about a century ago the world got a true idea of  the functions 
and scope of  the work of  the central bank. Historically observed, central banks have developed in two ways. 
The first one, through a slow process of  evolution from commercial banks that, having gained additional 
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power and responsibility in relation to the functioning of  the financial system, became central banks. Second 
way - through the adoption of  laws that have been established from the outset as institutions with the 
attributes of  the central bank (Beck et al., 2004). In the past, central banks were expected - in accordance with 
law, custom, or both - to use their instruments to achieve multiple goals, such as high growth and 
employment, securing funds for state expenditures and solving balance of  payments problems. Today, the 
legal and actual independence of  central banks is considerably higher than it was twenty years ago, and their 
primary goal has become price stability. 
With the creation of  the European Monetary Union, the national central banks have become part of  
the new central banking system, which is called the Eurosystem. It is made up of  the European Central Bank 
and the national central banks of  the Member States that have adopted the euro. These national central banks 
have lost their monetary sovereignty and no longer make independent decisions. In addition to this system, 
the European System of  Central Banks (ESCB), which includes all member states of  the European Union, 
operates. All EU countries are not members of  the EMU at the same time, and except Denmark, Sweden and 
the UK, they all want to become part of  it. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The most widespread indices of  central bank independence refer to the level of  independence 
determined by law. Real independence can often deviate significantly from legal independence. Such 
deviations are more significant in developing countries than in industrialized economies. The reason for this 
is probably better implementation of  laws in industrialized economies. Other types of  behavior-more focused, 
focus on the pace of  change in the governor's central bank relative to the statutory dynamics (used only for 
developing countries) and the political sensitivity of  the central bank governor. The second index is defined 
as the frequency of  cases in which the Governor changes over a short period after a political change. None 
of  these indexes fully represent the true independence of  the central bank, but, when taken together, provide 
a more complete picture of  the differences in central bank independence between countries over time. 
In addition, Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) compare the legal independence of  the central 
bank in former socialist economies with developed economies in the eighties; reveal a significantly higher 
level of  independence in the second group. Real independence depends not only on legal status, but also on 
various formal and informal institutional arrangements such as the exchange rate regime, the ability of  the 
bank to effectively engage in open market operations, the position of  fiscal policy, and the existence of  
explicit institutional arrangements (out of  regulation) which makes stability of  the price recognizable by the 
central bank. A prominent example of  this latter are various methods of  targeting inflation, adopted by some 
twenty countries following the implementation of  this innovation in New Zealand and Canada in the late 
1980s. 
The trend towards central bank independence was due to a combination of  global and regional 
factors. The two main global factors underlying the trend include, firstly, an increasing need around the world 
for the stability of  the price triggered by stagflation from the 1970s and the poor economic performance of  
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some high-inflation countries, both in Latin America and in other parts of  the world economy. Unlike the 
1960s and 1970s, the 1980s and 1990s, the view was that inflation and associated uncertainties slowed down 
growth. The relatively good performance of  low-inflation countries, such as Germany and Japan, upheld that 
attitude by the 1980s (Stella, 2002). 
The other factor is globalization, which implied the gradual abolition of  control over cash flows and 
the expansion of  international capital markets. These processes have been enhanced by the need for price 
stability and the greater importance of  central bank independence as a signal of  macroeconomic 
responsibility towards domestic and foreign investors. As Maxfield (1998) considers, this factor was 
particularly important in developing countries whose political systems were eagerly waiting to accelerate 
access to international capital markets. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also accepted the view that a 
high level of  independence was desirable and actively promoted the central bank reform in many emerging 
economies. 
Several regional factors have contributed to increasing independence: 
 
• The breakdown of institutions designed to protect nominal stability, such as the European Monetary System 
(EMS) and the Bretton Woods system, have increased the search for alternative institutions; 
• The good result of a very independent Bundesbank has shown that the independence of the central bank 
can function as an effective instrument for ensuring nominal stability, 
• The acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty by the European Economic Community (EEC) implied that many 
of the countries in the Community must improve the independence of their central bank as a prerequisite for 
membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The inclusion of this provision in the Agreement is 
linked to the good results of the Bundesbank and Germany's central position within the Community 
• After a successful stabilization of inflation, especially in Latin America, policy makers have sought 
institutional arrangements that can reduce the likelihood of high and sustained inflation in the future. The 
increase in the independence of the central bank seemed at the time as a natural way to achieve this goal; 
• In the former socialist countries, improving central bank independence and creating central banks on the 
basis of best western practice was part of a wider attempt to create the institutional framework needed for the 
proper functioning of the market economy. The fact that many banks have been given de jure independence 
is undoubtedly corroborated by evidence from industrialized economies that have indicated that inflation and 
legal independence are negatively linked, and that independence and growth are either positively related or 
not related in general. 
 
3. The monetary policy of  the European Central Bank vs. Monetary policy of  the National 
Bank of  Serbia 
3.1. Structure and functioning of  the European Central Bank and its monetary policy 
instruments 
 
The formation of  the European Economic and Monetary Union was a unique experiment, which 
introduced a new monetary regime with a single currency in much of  Europe. The transfer of  monetary 
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policies from a national level to the level of  the EU required a major change in European central banking. A 
supranational monetary organization was established, the European Central Bank (ECB), which with the 13 
national central banks that adopted the euro and thus lost its monetary sovereignty and the possibility of  
independent decision-making in the monetary sphere, constitutes a new supranational central banking system, 
called the Eurosystem. In addition to this system, the European System of  Central Banks (ESCB) operates, 
which today encompasses in all EU Member States. The European Central Bank is a specialized, independent 
institution that has the task of  defining and implementing monetary policy, managing exchange operations 
and ensuring the well functioning of  payment system. 
The primary task of  the European Central Bank is to ensure price stability, i.e. guarding the value of  
the euro as the single currency of  the Member States of  the European Monetary Union. By joining the EU, 
and preparing for membership in the monetary union, the central banks of  Member States and potential 
candidates must harmonize monetary policy and functioning in order to harmonize with the Eurosystem. 
They have to adjust the monetary regulation instruments, emphasizing the importance of  open market 
operations (in particular, the refinancing operation) and reducing the percentage of  required reserves. In 
addition to meeting the convergence criteria, the national currency of  the accession countries must be in the 
normal range of  ERM II two years before entering the Eurozone. ERM II represents a system of  flexible 
courses allowing the fluctuation of  national currencies against the euro by up to 15%. The new exchange rate 
mechanism (the so-called ERM-II), is established on the basis of  the Amsterdam European Council 
resolution of  16 June 1997, replaced the old mechanism of  the European Monetary System on 1 January 
1999. 
The process of  accession of  new EU member states to the monetary union is quite complicated - all 
steps towards the EMU must be accepted by the country concerned, the European Council, the European 
Central Bank and the European Commission (Cukierman, 2002). The entry of  each country is based on an 
individual basis. Engaging in ERM II before the end of  economic reforms is a very dangerous move for the 
accession countries; therefore it is necessary to complete all economic processes and reforms, especially those 
that are the result of  the former socialist regime. There are numerous problems and risks that central banks 
face, arising from the uncertainty surrounding the changed economic environment in which the monetary 
policy operates and which must be adapted: 
 
• There are national differences in the transmission of  monetary policy. 
• There is a risk that countries will be affected by asymmetric shocks. 
• The question arises whether, due to the decentralized nature of  the system, national interests will 
dominate in implementation of  the monetary policy. 
• Increased expectations for income growth, rising credit supply, and declining risk premiums lead 
to a sharp rise in demand for loans, although cyclical developments sometimes affect the 
reduction in demand. Whether used for investment or for consumption, these, always available, 
loans create pressure on national revenues and expenditures. 
• The development of  the financial system can lead to the possible impact of  imperfect capital 
markets. There may be major deviations in the risk premium and the exchange rate if  the 
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willingness to accept the euro changes. Also, moral hazard is constantly present as a potential 
problem. 
• Political risks must also be taken into account. Fiscal policy, coupled with a monetary policy, in 
order to reduce inflation, leads to an increase in interest rates, resulting in unreasonably high 
short-term capital inflows and unrealistic appreciation. Increased inflows of  funds can lead to a 
rise in demand and an increase in inflation. 
• Finally, experiences from other regions should serve as a useful framework for future 
decision-making. 
 
The Central Bank of  Accession States, with their mandate of  financial stability, must provide analyzes 
and data that point to national players, both public and private, on potential or emerging risks. All the 
dynamics of  the financial flows and the movement of  the exchange rate must be clearly outlined so that the 
process of  changing the exchange rate regime would be carried out with the full support of  the whole nations. 
The accession countries must support their involvement in the Eurozone by closely monitoring and analyzing 
the experiences of  other advanced economies, including the current states of  the Eurozone, and their 
experience in real and financial convergence (Geraats, 2002). 
They need to provide an optimal allocation of  resources, whose inflow is expected from the 
over-appreciated real exchange rate or low risk premium. Regardless of  the potential difficulties and 
momentary ambiguities and stagnation in the negotiations between Serbia and the European Union, Serbia 
must make the most effort to approach the convergence criteria prescribed for EMU membership. Therefore, 
the analysis of  the monetary policy convergence of  Serbia and EMU monetary policy is necessary. 
 
The following aggregates are included in the money supply: 
• M1 = Cash in circulation + Demand deposits, 
• M2 = M1 + Short-term deposits, which can be withdrawn from the account within 3 months 
+ Term deposits up to two years + Other short-term deposits, 
• M3 = M2 + Recovery deals + Money Market Funds + Securities with a maturity of  up to 
two years + Other eligible instruments. 
 
In achieving the ultimate goals of  monetary policy, central banks use different instruments of  
monetary regulation. Their application or combination, depending on the way they are created, affects the 
quantum of  money supply, which will ensure optimum economic development, observed from the aspect of  
stability and economic growth. The choice of  instruments depends on the conditions in which the economic 
and financial system functions. Therefore, there are differences in monetary regulation instruments in some 
countries. The European Central Bank has at its disposal a wide range of  instruments (Cukierman and Lippi, 
2005). The Governing Council of  the ECB, with its decisions, defined the monetary policy instruments that 
the ECB and the Eurosystem use in practice, as well as the conditions for their application. To achieve its 
objectives, the ECB uses open market operations ,liquidity loans, mandatory reserve. 
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3.2. Structure and functioning of  the National Bank of  Serbia and its monetary policy 
instruments 
 
The position, organization, powers and functions of  the National Bank of  Serbia, as well as the 
attitude of  the National Bank of  Serbia towards the organs of  the Republic of  Serbia and international 
organizations and institutions, are regulated by the Constitution of  the Republic of  Serbia and the Law on the 
National Bank of  Serbia ("Official Gazette of  the Republic of  Serbia" No. 72/2003 , 55/2004, 44/2010, 
76/2012 and 106/2012). The National Bank of  Serbia is independent and independent in the performance 
of  its functions as defined by the Law on the National Bank of  Serbia and other laws, and for its work it is 
responsible to the National Assembly of  the Republic of  Serbia. The main goal of  the National Bank of  
Serbia is to achieve and preserve price stability. In addition, without prejudice to the achievement of  its 
primary objective, the National Bank of  Serbia contributes to the preservation and strengthening of  the 
stability of  the financial system. The bodies of  the National Bank of  Serbia are Executive Board, Governor 
and Board of  Governors. 
The Executive Board determines the reference interest rate and other interest rates applied by the 
National Bank of  Serbia in the implementation of  monetary policy. In addition, the Executive Board, on the 
proposal of  the Supervisory Board, issues the regulations of  the National Bank of  Serbia in the field of  
control and supervisory function, in accordance with the laws regulating the performance of  these functions 
(Blinder., 1998). 
The Executive Committee decides on the granting of  preliminary approvals as well as on the granting 
and revocation of  operating licenses to banks, the granting and confiscation of  insurance companies for 
licensing activities, the granting and revocation of  licenses for the conduct of  financial leasing activities, the 
granting and confiscation of  management companies Voluntary pension funds a work permit and a license to 
manage those funds (National Bank of  Serbia, 2013). The Executive Committee makes decisions at sessions, 
with the majority of  votes of  all members. In the case of  an equal number of  votes, the Governor shall 
decide. The Governor, as Chairman of  the Executive Board, signs the decisions made by the Executive 
Committee. He is obliged to submit to the Council reports on the implementation of  monetary policy, 
reports on the approval and revocation of  operating licenses for commercial banks, the legality of  work and 
the solvency of  commercial banks and other financial organizations. On the other hand, the Council is not a 
fully independent body because it is elected by the Serbian Parliament and is obligated to submit a report on 
its work at least once a year. In order for the Council to independently and impartially make decisions, its 
members can not have a conflict of  interest on any basis, and therefore can not be employed by the National 
Bank. The Governor's Council consists of  five members, including the President, elected by the National 
Assembly on the proposal of  the National Assembly Committee responsible for finance. Council members 
are elected for five years, with the right to re-election (Statistical Office of  the Republic of  Serbia). 
 
Monetary policy instruments of  the National Bank of  Serbia are: 
• mandatory reserve, 
• open market operations, 
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• collateralized loans for maintaining daily liquidity, 
• depositing surplus liquid assets of  banks with the National Bank of  Serbia, discount rate, minimum 
credit terms of  the bank, and 
• harmonization of  retail loans with the share capital of  the bank. 
 
The National Bank of  Serbia uses the following three monetary aggregates: 
• M1 = Cash in circulation + Sight deposits, 
• M2 = M1 + Dinar deposits, 
• M3 = M2 + Foreign currency deposits. 
 
The National Bank of  Serbia has the following functions: 
• determines and implements monetary and foreign exchange policies; 
• manage foreign reserves; 
• determines and implements, within its competence, activities and measures in order to preserve and 
strengthen the stability of  the financial system; 
• issues and revokes work permits and performs control of  the creditworthiness and legality of  
operations of  banks and performs other activities in accordance with the law regulating banks; 
• issues and revokes the licenses, i.e. powers to perform insurance activities, and supervises the 
performance of  such activities and performs other activities, in accordance with the law regulating 
insurance; 
• issues and revokes operating licenses for voluntary pension fund management companies, supervises 
this activity and performs other tasks, in accordance with the law governing voluntary pension funds; 
• issues and revokes licenses for leasing operations, supervises the performance of  these operations and 
performs other activities, in accordance with the law governing leasing; 
• performs the tasks of  protecting the rights and interests of  the users of  services provided by banks, 
financial leasing companies, insurance companies and companies for managing voluntary pension funds 
in accordance with the law; 
• Issues banknotes and coins and manages cash flows; 
• regulates, controls and improves the smooth operation of  domestic and international payment 
operations in accordance with the law; 
• performs the tasks determined for the Republic of  Serbia by law or contract, without jeopardizing 
their independence and independence. 
 
 
4. Statistical analysis of  the interdependence between monetary policies of  the NBS and the 
ECB 
 
Statistical analysis of  the interdependence of  monetary policies of  the National Bank of  Serbia and 
the European Central Bank was carried out in the statistical program (SPSS) based on variables that are 
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relevant to evaluate the strength of  the relationship between these two monetary policies. The monetary 
aggregates of  both central banks and foreign reserves in millions of  euros are taken into account. The 
aforementioned evaluation of  the interdependence between the two monetary policies has been carried out 
on the basis of  several of  the following analyzes: 
 
• Correlation analysis - Pearson coefficient 
• Regression analysis 
• Hi square test 
• Distribution probability and scatter diagram. 
 
The statistical model and the conducted analysis are based on previously set hypotheses on models of  the 
interdependence of  monetary policies: 
 
• H0- There is a minimum level of  connection between the two monetary policies to given values of  
monetary aggregates (in millions of  euros) 
• H1- There is a statistically significant link between the two monetary policies to the values of  
monetary aggregates (in millions of  euros) 
 
4.1. Correlation analysis of  NBS vs. ECB 
 
The coefficient of  free linear correlation, as a relative measure, takes values from -1 to +1. If  it takes 
positive values, the correlation between phenomena is either direct or positive (both phenomena exhibit 
concurrent variations). In the case where r <0, the connection is inverse or negative (when one phenomenon 
increases the other decreases, and vice versa). If  there is a functional connection between the observed 
phenomena (all the empirical points are right on the right line), we are talking about perfect correlation. Then 
the coefficient of  correlation takes the value -1 (if  the connection is inverse) or +1 (if  the connection is 
direct). The correlation coefficient is absolutely closer to the unit means that the correlation between the 
phenomena is stronger. Against this, the closer it is to zero, the linear relationship is weaker. 
In the following tables, the degree of  connection between individual variables of  the two monetary 
policies, such as the monetary aggregates of  the NBS and the ECB, and the NBS foreign exchange reserves, 
were analyzed. From this example, based on the significance level (Sig. = 0.000), the zero hypothesis is 
rejected, i.e. the assumption that there is a minimal correlation between the given variables. On the other 
hand, it can be seen that the value of  the correlation coefficient is quite large but negative or inverse for a 
given variable, which only speaks of  the opposite in the movement of  their values. (-0.889, -0.733) 
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Correlations 
  M1ECB M1NBS 
M1ECB 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.889** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 27 27 
M1NBS 
Pearson Correlation -.889** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 27 27 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Correlations 
  DevrezNBS M1ECB 
DevrezNBS 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.733** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 27 27 
M1ECB 
Pearson Correlation -.733** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 27 27 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Source:Authors’ estimation  
 
 
4.2. Regression analysis of  NBS vs. ECB 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
DevrezNBS 1258.78 346.199 32 
DeppovECB 2191616.75 90172.663 32 
M1ECB 5930917.88 504110.136 32 
M2ECB 9662175.00 406707.023 32 
M3ECB 10306646.78 401770.341 32 
 
The following tables of  the regression model, which in this case examines the impact of  the NBS 
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foreign exchange reserve on the monetary aggregates of  the ECB, are the most important when it comes to 
interpreting the results. Namely, the coefficient of  multiple correlation R, which shows the linear correlation 
between the original values of  the dependent variable and the model of  the predicted value of  the dependent 
variable is 0.800, which indicates a very strong connection. The coefficient of  determination shows that a 
good 80% of  the variability of  the NBS foreign exchange reserves category can be explained by the 
regression model, that is, the independent variables belonging to the monetary aggregates of  the ECB. The 
value of  the corrected determination coefficient (0.770) is very close to the value of  the normal coefficient of  
determination, due to the favorable relationship between the independent variables and the total number of  
NBS foreign exchange reserves (the number of  independent variables is 4, and the number of  observations 
32). 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mod
el R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of  the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-W
atson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .894a .800 .770 165.949 .800 26.979 4 27 .000 .695 
a. Predictors: (Constant), M3ECB, DeppovECB, M1ECB, M2ECB 
b. Dependent Variable: DevrezNBS 
 
Regarding the ANOVA procedure within the regression model, it examines the validity of  the 
regression model from the statistical standpoint. This is about proving the hypothesis that: 
 
H0 : R
2= 0 ili H1:R
2≠0 
 
Based on the output results in the Sig. = 0,000 column, the conclusion is that the zero hypothesis is rejected 
and that the coefficient of  determination is greater than 0, which has been proven. This confirms that the 
regression model explains a significant amount of  variability of  the dependent variable. 
 
ANOVAb 
Model 
Sum of  
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2971904.495 4 742976.124 26.979 .000a 
Residual 743550.974 27 27538.925   
Total 3715455.469 31    
a. Predictors: (Constant), M3ECB, DeppovECB, M1ECB, M2ECB 
b. Dependent Variable: DevrezNBS 
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In the last table of  coefficients, standardized beta coefficients are noted that show the significance of  the 
influence of  individual independent variables on the dependent variable. In fact, these coefficients reduce 
independent variables to identical phenomena, so that all independent variables are treated the same way with 
the same scaling scale. Quite logically, some values of  the β coefficients are negative, which is consistent with 
the correlation coefficients from the results shown above. As for factors affecting foreign exchange reserves, 
the monetary aggregate M1 ECB takes over for the greater primacy in relation to the progress of  others. 
 
 
The distribution of  residuals on the P-P Plot and on the dispersion diagram shows the absence of  a normal 
distribution of  residuals in the form of  rectangles and the formation of  the residual curve line on the 
scattering diagram. In this way, the existence of  heteroskedasticity is confirmed. 
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Source:Authors’ estimation  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Central Bank has dominant position in organizing, directing and regulating the contemporary 
financial flows of  all countries of  the world. Central banks have a number of  functions, and among the most 
important is the conduct of  monetary policy. The Central Bank is a state institution that oversees the banking 
system and is responsible for the amount of  money and loans that exist in the economy as a whole. 
Monetary policy is the basic task of  regulating the amount of  money in circulation, maintaining a 
balance between commodity and money funds, to enable the smooth flow of  goods traffic and stable 
economic flows. Monetary policy uses a number of  instruments in performing the basic function, regulating 
the necessary amount of  money in the economy. The monetary and economic stability of  the country 
depends on their type, number and efficiency, as well as achieving the envisaged rate of  its economic growth. 
Comparative analysis of  the practices and policies of  the National Bank of  Serbia and the European 
Central Bank can further strain further measures and policies of  the NBS towards the proclaimed criteria of  
convergence of  the European Union. In the further management of  monetary policy, the National Bank of  
Serbia, in addition to suppressing inflationary tendencies and expectations, needs to focus more on the 
harmonization of  its regulations and practices with the regulations of  the European Monetary Union. Also, 
in order to fulfill the conditions and criteria for introducing the euro as a single currency, it is necessary to 
achieve a larger role of  open market operations as an instrument of  monetary policy, with a special emphasis 
on fine-tuning. Insisting on greater institutional, operational and personal independence in the work of  the 
National Bank of  Serbia is something that makes up the modern functioning of  a central bank to which 
should strive and continually improve. 
In essence, the functions of  the National Bank of  Serbia should be reduced to achieving quantitative 
(regulation of  the required amount of  money) and qualitative (structure of  money and credit) objectives and 
tasks. The efficiency of  achieving these functions can generally be gained through the level of  inflation as a 
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synthetic indicator of  the general state of  the economy. In close connection with the exercise of  its functions, 
it is important to underline that monetary policy can - in no case - be an element of  socialization of  risk in 
the economy. 
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